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Macroeconomic Forecasting in Poland: Lessons From the COVID-19 Outbreak. 
Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the forecast errors of Polish professional forecasters under 
the COVID-19 crisis in 2020—based on the Parkiet competition. This analysis shows that after 
the initial disruption related to imposed lockdown in March and April, commercial economists 
were capable of lowering their forecasts errors of the industrial production and retail sales. On 
the other hand, the far worse performance has been seen in the case of the market variable; 
either the size of errors or the disagreement were elevated throughout the entirety of 2020. 
Furthermore, long-term forecasts that were produced during the first year of the pandemic have 
been characterized with visible inconsistencies (i.e., projections of economic growth were 
similar when forecasters either assumed a strong increase in unemployment or when they did 
not).  
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the forecasts errors of Polish professional forecasters 
during the year 2020 (i.e., in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic). Such an analysis should 
provide guidance for the statistical office. This will help to answer which areas provide reliable 
public information for the basis of creating forecasts. This study is based on a database of 
individual forecasts from two competitions that are managed by a daily newspaper named 
Rzeczpospolita.  
First, we analyzed the accuracy of monthly nowcasts, that were based on 12 polls, 
published from January to December 2020. Nowcast stands for the estimate of the current data 
release, which was published prior to the official information. Estimates are published by 
approximately 27 analysts. Second, we analyzed four series of one-year projections that were 
published by 30 economic experts. Analysts provides information about expected GDP growth, 
their components, and the unemployment rate. We then analyze that information in the context 
for either unbiasedness or a rationality of revisions.  
The monthly polls show that the COVID-19 outbreak resulted in the increase of both 
industrial production and retail sales forecasts errors, which caused a large amount of 
disagreement for the first three months of the pandemic. After that period, commercial 
economists were capable of reducing errors. On the other hand, economists have a much worse 
performance in forecasting the conditions of the labor market. Both forecasts errors and the 
disagreement remained elevated for the entire year.  
The one year ahead forecasts, which were produced during the COVID-19 pandemic, 
were not statistically efficient. First, revisions were often exaggerated in the wake of 
lockdowns. Second, labor market errors were one-sided. Furthermore, there are evident 
inconsistencies between the revisions of macroeconomic variables. Revisions of the labor 
market forecast has not influenced estimates for Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, 
despite the strong scale of changes. 
This manuscript is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review on 
macroeconomic forecasting and irregularities that are visible in Poland. Section 3 provides a 
description of used dataset. Section 4 delivers information about the methodology of our 
research. Section 5 summarizes problems related to nowcasting of macroeconomic variables 
during the COVID-19 outbreak. Section 6 discusses the inconsistencies that are visible in the 
one year ahead forecasts. Finally, section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. Literature Review 
The COVID-19 shock has created unprecedented volatility in the macroeconomic time 
series, which strongly influences forecasting. During the period of the first Great Lockdown 
(March to May 2020), the average lifetime of macroeconomic forecasts was likely to not 
survive one month. Second, in the summer of 2020, forecasts prepared worldwide were 
systematically more pessimistic when compared to the future realizations; real tam economic 
surprise indices, such as presented in the work of (Scotti, 2016), reached an all-time high. 
In a response, the academic literature on macroeconomic forecasting became focused 
on the correct estimation of traditional models, as well as developments of the nowcasting 
techniques (Foroni et al., 2020; Lenza & Primiceri, 2020). Researchers usually attempt to build 
complex solutions to either incorporate a real time flow of information (Mamaysky, 2020) or 
adapt epidemiological frameworks (Eichenbaum et al., 2020). Although we do not want to 
depreciate these efforts, one needs to note that those outcomes are usually not publicly 
available. In addition to that, replication will exceed the capacity of business economists. The 
commercial work consumes a great majority of time; this involves the publishing of daily 
comments, as well as the providing of presentations or calls to both internal and external clients. 
This limits the possibilities for using complex econometrics. Therefore, their practical 
application may be dead-on-arrival.  
The forecasts produced during economic crisis are usually imperfect; the errors are 
usually biased and the revisions are sometimes irrational (Eicher et al., 2019). The weak 
performance is present in the case of commercial economists and  international institutions, 
like the International Monetary Fund or European Commission—they often make similar 
mistakes (An et al., 2018). 
Nevertheless, a relatively low number of researches are trying to answer this question: 
in which areas are forecasting professionals creating the biggest mistakes and how can we 
improve on said mistakes? This study aims to fill that gap. It presents a detailed analysis of the 
economic forecasts in Poland; where data availability of short-term macroeconomic projections 
is far greater than that of the most developed European nation.  
This analysis is focused on the behavior of financial business economists. The key thing 
to understand, is that the goal of a commercial professional is not to minimize Root Means 
Squared Errors (RMSE) at any cost, but rather to represent their institution. This results in 
motivational biases - some of them have been presented in the (Rybacki, 2020). This problem 
has been visible, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. After the first lockdowns, analysts 
published numbers which had poor justification; this is because they were expected to present 
some view e.g., for risk management purposes or public statements in the press.  
This problem has been evident in the National Bank of Poland’s macroeconomic survey 
of professional forecasters (Kowalczyk, 2010); economists show very wide bands of 
uncertainty in 2020, as well as a declining risk in 2021. Such an assessment is mathematically 
controversial; the GDP growth for 2021 is strictly related to the previous year’s performance. 
Therefore, such a result was unlikely to be produced by the formal macroeconomic model. This 
evidence highlights the judgmental role in the forecasting during the period of macroeconomic 
stress. Although such heuristics are both flawed and prone to biases, there is strong evidence 
that shows that human expertise is beneficial during periods of excessive uncertainty 
(Lawrence et al., 2006).  
We are focusing on the forecasts produced during the pandemic as they have much 
greater implications, as opposed to mere standard times; they shape the financial market 
expectations and, consequently, become a basis for policymaking. Particularly, they are used 
to justify what scale of government interventions, like financial shields, are required. The 
analysis of forecasts accuracy does not allow for the general reasoning about the normal times; 
statistical efficiency, in such cases, were presented in the (Rybacki, 2021). 
From a perspective of institutions, like the statistical office or the central bank, such an 
evaluation should help to answer which areas’ publicly available information give a more 
reliable basis in order to create forecasts.  
3. Database 
This analysis is based on the database of individual forecasts that participated in both 
the Parkiet forecasting competition for monthly nowcasts, during the years 2015 to 2020, and 
the Rzeczpospolita competition—during the year 2020.  
The Parkiet monthly consensus poll contains information about every major indicator 
that is published by both the Central Statistical Office (GUS) and the National Bank of Poland 
on a continuous basis. These include Purchasing Managers Index (PMI), Consumer and 
Producer Price Index (CPI & PPI), industrial production, retail sales, construction output, 
corporate employment & wages, unemployment rate, exports, imports, and current account 
(CA) balance. Macroeconomic forecasts usually describe the Year-on-Year growth. In the case 
of PMI, the jury decided to use index level; and in the case of foreign trade variables, EUR 
denominated figures. The CA balance is also presented as a level. In 2020, there were 24 
participants; 22 of them (92%) represent banks or financial intermediaries. The other two 
participants represent think-tanks.   
The consensus for the Rzeczpospolita forecasting competition is collected quarterly. In 
2020, analysts provided information about the year-on-year growth of GDP, private 
consumption, gross fixed capital formation, CPI, and the unemployment rate level. There were 
approximately 30 participants. Again, a similar proportion of participants represent commercial 
financial institutions.  
These two contests are recognized as the most prestigious competitions among the 
many financial institutions in Poland. The number of participants is higher, when compared to 
the National Bank of Poland’s survey of professional forecasters (SPF). The panel is more 
balanced; throughout a year, there are practically no cases in which a participant failed to 
complete a survey. This is not a case of SPF. 
Furthermore, the poll is developed with constant contact with commercial economists. 
Therefore, it is scheduled to be perfectly synchronized with the estimation of nowcasts. This is 
not always true in the cases of Bloomberg and Reuters consensus. For example, Bloomberg 
requires a short-term estimate of flash CPI a week before data release. These estimates are 
made prior to the publication of the GUS statistical bulletin. Therefore, results are frequently 
different than polls that are later published by Reuters, the Polish Press Agency, and Parkiet. 
4. Methodology 
This section describes the methodology. The research is divided into two parts. In the 
first part, we analyze the simple descriptive statistics of forecasts errors for the short-term 
macroeconomic variables. We attempt to analyze magnitude forecasts uncertainty of four 
macroeconomic indicators, which were the strongest affected by the pandemic (i.e., corporate 
employment, wages, industrial production, and retail sales).  
Our analysis is based on the dispersion between the forecasts. We calculate an 
interquartile range (IQR) of individual estimates in the subsequent months of 2020. This 
statistic eliminates 25% of the most pessimistic and the most optimistic forecasts. We compare 
these values to the average levels from the years 2015 to 2019, separately, for each subsequent 
month. We also wish to verify whether analysts were capable of lowering their errors after the 
initial lockdowns in March to April 2020. We propose a simple equation:  
𝐼𝑄𝑅𝑡𝐼𝑄𝑅𝑎𝑣𝑔,𝑚 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1 ∗ 𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡   (1) 
Where 𝐼𝑄𝑅𝑡 is an interquartile range for the forecast at the time, 𝑡, 𝐼𝑄𝑅𝑎𝑣𝑔,𝑚 is an 
average interquartile range for forecasts in the years 2015 to 2019 for the month 𝑚, 𝑎0 and 𝑎1 
are estimated parameters,  𝑒𝑡 is a random disturbance. We expect 𝑎1 to be: 
1. Negative for activity forecasts; i.e., the industrial production and the retail sales.  
2. Positive or statistically insignificant for the employment figures.  
We expect to see lowering disagreement in case of industrial production, retail sales, 
and corporate wages. Corporate employment is likely to have elevated disagreement. 
In the second part, we attempt to analyze the efficiency of the forecasts and the 
consistency between revisions of long-term estimates based on panel models. This analysis is 
also based on the database of individual forecasts, which participate in the second competition 
(the Rzeczpospolita contest) for the best macroeconomic analysts. We are analyzing forecasts 
for the two macroeconomic indicators: GDP growth and the unemployment rate.  
First, we attempt to answer whether forecasts were efficiently in line with the Nordhaus 
definition (Nordhaus, 1987). This concept assumes that revisions should be totally 
unpredictable (i.e., information about previous forecasts should not give any clues on how they 
will be changed in the next months). The systemic errors were present in the Polish GDP 
forecasts—even before the pandemic (Rybacki, 2021). We propose a simple model:  𝑑(𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑡) = 𝑎0 +  𝑎1 ∗ 𝑑(𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑡−1) + 𝑒𝑡   (2) 
The notation is similar when compared to equation 1. We expect parameter 𝑎0 to be 
different than zero. In such a case, published estimates have obvious one-sided biases. We also 
see whether parameter 𝑎1 is negative and less than one. This implies that analysts are making 
excessive corrections, which are reverted in the next round of forecasts.  
Second, we would like to verify whether forecasts revisions were rational. The increase 
of the unemployment rate should have a negative effect on the growth forecasts and 
consumption. We attempt to estimate a simple model where the revision of consumption 
forecast  (𝑓𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡) is explained by the revision of unemployment rate (𝑓𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡,). 
This formula is presented in equation 4. 
𝑑(𝑓𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑡) = 𝑎0 +  𝑎1 ∗ 𝑑(𝑓𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑡,) + 𝑒𝑡   (3) 
We estimate the independent equations for each period and forecasts horizon. Our aim 
is to verify whether relationship between these revisions is negative for each time period. Then, 
we would like to check if the response is different in case of negative and positive revision. 
Finally, in case of the longer forecasts, we would like to discuss to what extent revisions are 
related to exogenous assumptions.  
5. Nowcasting of monthly activity and labor market conditions after the COVID-19 
outbreak.  
This section summarizes the accuracy of a nowcasts that was published during 2020. Nowcasts 
are approximations of current economic conditions that are published prior to the official 
statistical office data release. The disagreement between the forecasters, consensus errors, and 
parameters of estimated models are all presented in Tables 1 to 4.  
The biggest errors were recorded in April; the data published at that time describes the 
economic reality from March. Similarly, the scale of uncertainty in this month was also the 
highest during the entirety of 2020. The interquartile ranges of forecasts are presented in Figure 
1. Analysts were forced to forecast effects of the lockdown—an unprecedented event. Given 
no evidence of such episodes in the past, these actions were blindly accepted.  
Fig 1. How many times interquartile range of forecasts was higher comparing to the 
average from 2015 to 2019 in the subsequent months of 2020.  
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Analysts improved their accuracy regarding the forecasting of retail sales; errors and 
disagreement have decreased over time, most likely due to analyzing real time data from both 
debit and credit card payments3. This evidence is confirmed by the model; the 𝑎1 parameter is 
statistically significant and is equal to -0.46. However, at the end of 2020, the disagreement 
between the forecasters was still twice higher than before the pandemic and amounted to two 
to three percentage points. Uncertainty was especially elevated during periods with a greater 
number of infections. For example, in September, the disagreement was over four times higher 
than in the years of 2015 to 2019.  
Economic experts also had no major problems when it came to forecasting industrial 
production. During the years of 2015 to 2019, the interquartile range averaged slightly over 
one percentage point. We also observed similar values in the fourth quarter of 2020. The model 
confirms fading uncertainty; the estimated parameter 𝑎1 for this variable is equal to -0.31.  
From the third quarter onwards, wage forecasts didn’t deviate from the usual trend—either. At 
the end of the year, the disagreement between the forecasters was an approximate 0.3 
percentage point. The large fluctuations were only observed in the period of March to May. 
This resulted from the unclear impact of the anti-crisis government response. The effects of 
subsidizing compensations were difficult to assess by the commercial analysts. In case of this 
variable estimated parameter 𝑎1 is equal to -0.22.  
Economists cannot effectively forecast employment in the enterprise sector. Normally, analysts 
make errors of a 0.1 percentage point. They are also nearly unanimous in their forecasts. During 
the pandemic, these figures were multiple times higher; in June, the disagreement of forecasters 
was 16 times greater than what has been observed in previous years. At the end of the year, it 
was 5 times higher than in the years 2015 to 2019, despite even the large fluctuations of the 
headline figure having vanished. 
This evidence is also present in the model. Although the estimated parameter 𝑎1 is negative (-
0.61), it is strongly influenced by the June reading. Therefore, the standard deviation of this 
parameter is high and, contrary to the previous estimations, it is statistically insignificant. This 
evidence confirms the problem described in the previous paragraph.  
                                                 
3 An example of such analysis, is the Santander report regarding consumption expenditure during the 
restrictions in November 2020, after the country was divided in the yellow and red COVID-19 zones.  
6. Macroeconomic forecasting during the COVID-19 pandemic.   
This section summarizes the accuracy of long-term forecasts published during 2020, 
with a horizon of one to three quarters ahead. The model, which is based on equation 2, 
confirms a lack of efficiency in the case of GDP and in the unemployment rate forecasts. 
Results are presented in Tables 5 and 6.  
A first glance at the consensus reveals that economists systematically presented an 
overly pessimistic picture of the unemployment rate. The evolution of the consensus duration 
is presented in Figure 2; the revisions are rather one-sided, so we can see a constant delaying 
of periods when unemployment was expected to increase. 
Fig 2. Unemployment rate consensus forecast under the COVID-19 pandemic  
 
Source: Rzeczpospolita daily 
Forecasts were systematically reduced across all horizons (i.e., from the incoming 
quarter to one year ahead). The biggest reductions were visible in the case of estimates with 
the lower horizon; within a quarter to publication, analysts lowered estimates – on average – 
by 0.6pp. The magnitude for other horizons were slightly lower and amounted to 0.3-0.4pp. 
The negative parameter 𝑎1 suggests a tendency for excess revision; this is especially visible in 
the case of forecasts from Q2, in which analysts were predicting an imminent contraction of 
employment.  
Analysts have also exaggerated the effects of the economic lockdowns in the case of 
the GDP forecasts, although the errors of these estimates are less one-sided. After restrictions 
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the 4Q by the second wave of infections that resulted in another period of excessive negative 
errors. This evolution of consensus is presented in Figure 3. 
Fig 3. GDP growth consensus forecast under the COVID-19 pandemic  
 
Source: Rzeczpospolita daily 
The model parameters have similar interpretations like in the case of the unemployment 
rate. Systematic biases and excessive revisions were present in the economic debate in Poland 
–even prior to the COVID-19 pandemic (Rybacki, 2021). The period of the pandemic is not 
different.  
The analysis shows a lack of consistency between the revisions of consumption and the 
unemployment rate. Basic specifications (Table 7) show a positive correlation between 
amendments to the forecasts for these two variables. When analysts forecasted a better outlook 
for consumption, they could simultaneously be more pessimistic on the labor market conditions 
–and vice versa. The relationship is statistically insignificant; still, it is worth considering why 
revisions of economic activity were detached from the labor market conditions.  
We repeated the estimation separately for each period. The direction of revisions was 
intuitive in the first half of 2020; expectations of bigger unemployment resulted in a worse 
activity outlook. Nevertheless, the explanatory power of these equations is very weak; the r-
squared coefficient is usually lower than 10%. During the second half of 2020, the relationship 
was broken and changes to labor market assumption were insignificant. The average magnitude 
of revision – in the consumption corresponding to changes in the labor market assumption – is 
much lower than in the case of the intercept, which captures exogenous factors like 
expectations of lockdown conditions. In the case of the longest horizon (three quarters ahead), 
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7. Policy Conclusions 
The COVID-19 pandemic revealed a weak understanding of the labor market conditions 
among the Polish economists. Problems related to forecasting were visible the in case of 
identifying current conditions, as well as preparing long term predictions.  
If a single analyst is wrong, it is a problem of his or her negligence. However, when a 
community of analysts is overall incapable of presenting a reliable view on the labor market 
condition, it is a problem of both fiscal and monetary authorities; their decisions may be based 
on a very inaccurate picture of the economy. There are three areas in which this should be 
investigated. 
First, the data dissemination policies of the statistical office need to be reviewed. The 
likely reason behind the problem with both forecasting employment and unemployment, is the 
lack of sufficient information about the process that is provided by the statistical office.  
Second, the public statistics in Poland likely do not have all the necessary information 
to describe the labor market. The statistical office (GUS) is mainly asking companies about 
permanent labor contracts. However, the possibilities of employment in Poland are not limited 
to this form; there is a significant share of both business-to-business and civil law contracts. 
Broadening the mandate of GUS to gather more information may be am advantageous move.  
Finally, greater attention should be directed towards the academia sector. The National 
Science Centre in Poland is providing funding for various scientific research projects that 
analyze the shape of the labor market. Unfortunately, the pandemic highlighted that this 
accumulated knowledge is not supportive during economic downturns. The current recruitment 
process is not considering potential application of research in the grant mechanisms; 
furthermore, commercial experts are not accessing the potential viability of the projects. A 
greater emphasis on these practical aspects should be beneficial.  
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Table 1: Forecast characteristics - employment in the enterprise sector 
Month of 
publication 







1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
2 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.7 
3 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
4 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.1 
5 1.5 0.0 0.5 0.1 
6 0.6 0.1 0.6 0.0 
7 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.1 
8 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.1 
9 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.1 
10 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.1 
11 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 






T - statistics P-value 𝑎0 11.39 3.99 2.85 0.02 𝑎1 -0.61 0.47 -1.28 0.24 
This model is based on the equation presented in formula 1. 
 
Table 2: Forecast characteristics - corporate wages in the enterprise sector 
Month of 
publication 







1 0.1 0.7 0.8 0.7 
2 0.3 0.4 0.9 0.8 
3 0.8 0.1 0.6 0.5 
4 0.1 0.9 1.7 0.5 
5 2.5 0.6 1.5 0.7 
6 0.3 0.5 1.7 0.5 
7 2.5 1.0 1.2 0.6 
8 1.1 0.3 1.1 0.6 
9 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.5 
10 1.2 0.5 0.4 0.5 
11 0.0 0.6 0.7 0.4 






T - statistics P-value 𝑎0 3.78 0.60 6.27 0.00 𝑎1 -0.22 0.07 -3.10 0.02 
This model is based on the equation presented in formula 1. 
 
Table 3: Forecast characteristics - industrial production 
Month of 
publication 







1 2.2 1.4 2.2 2.3 
2 0.8 1.3 1.5 2.8 
3 2.9 1.2 1.8 1.4 
4 0.2 2.2 6.4 1.7 
5 12.2 2.4 6.8 2.1 
6 0.6 1.1 5.3 1.8 
7 7.8 0.6 2.9 2.0 
8 3.2 0.7 4.7 2.3 
9 1.3 2.4 2.2 1.7 
10 2.5 0.9 2.0 1.1 
11 0.0 1.2 1.5 1.5 






T - statistics P-value 𝑎0 4.63 0.57 8.17 0.00 𝑎1 -0.31 0.07 -4.65 0.00 
This model is based on the equation presented in formula 1. 
 
Table 4: Forecast characteristics – Retail sales 
Month of 
publication 







1 0.1 2.1 1.9 1.7 
2 1.0 1.8 1.7 1.3 
3 3.2 0.5 1.5 1.1 
4 7.0 1.5 9.0 1.2 
5 3.9 1.8 7.7 1.4 
6 4.3 0.6 4.9 1.1 
7 1.7 0.5 3.2 0.9 
8 3.6 0.5 3.0 1.1 
9 2.1 0.7 2.1 1.1 
10 0.1 1.7 2.9 0.7 
11 1.7 0.7 3.4 1.0 






T - statistics P-value 𝑎0 7.61 1.31 5.80 0.00 𝑎1 -0.46 0.16 -2.98 0.02 
This model is based on the equation presented in formula 1. 
 
Table 5: Revisions of unemployment rate forecasts – panel model 
Horizon (quarters) 1 2 3 𝑎1 -0.40 (0.06, 0.00) -0.30 (0.06, 0.00) -0.36 (0.06, 0.00) 𝑎0 -0.59 (0.08, 0.00) -0.36 (0.09, 0.00) -0.31 (0.09, 0.00) 
 
Periods 3 3 3 
Cross sections 31 31 31 
Observations 93 93 93 
R-squared 0.69 0.60 0.66 
This model is based on the equation presented in formula 2. Negative parameter 𝑎0 denotes excessive 
pessimism regarding labor market conditions amongst the forecasters; their estimates of the unemployment 
rate were systematically lowered with the next surveys.  
 
Table 6: Revisions of GDP forecasts – panel model 
Horizon (quarters) 1 2 3 𝑎1 -0.25 (0.06, 0.00) -0.27 (0.09, 0.00) -0.44 (0.09, 0.00) 𝑎0 -1.78 (0.26, 0.00) -1.05 (0.27, 0.00) -1.12 (0.22, 0.00) 
 
Periods 3 3 3 
Cross sections 31 31 31 
Observations 93 93 93 
R-squared 0.58 0.55 0.50 
This model is based on the equation presented in formula 2. Negative parameter 𝑎0 denotes excessive 
pessimism regarding economic activity amongst the forecasters; their estimates of GDP growth were expected 
to improve with the next surveys.  
 
 
Table 7: Revisions of Consumption forecasts – panel model 
Horizon (quarters) 1 2 3 















Periods 3 3 3 
Cross sections 31 31 31 
Observations 93 93 93 
R-squared 0.38 0.35 0.38 
This model is based on the equation presented in formula 3. The positive parameter  𝑎1 shows that the assumption over labor market played a relatively minor role in shaping forecasts for 





Table 8: Revisions of Consumption forecasts (3Q ahead) – cross section estimates  
























R-squared 0.13 0.07 0.04 0.10 
Actual data - average revision of the: 
Unemployment rate 3.0 -0.7 -0.5 -0.4 
Consumption growth rate -3.6 0.2 1.7 -1.3 
What magnitude of revision in consumption forecast is explained by the: 
Change in the labor market assumption -2.0 0.3 -0.3 0.5 
Exogenous factors (constant) -1.6 -0.1 2.0 -1.8 
Implied random disturbance 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
This model is based on the equation presented in formula 3—within a single period.   
 
